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Abstract 
It is argued that the competitive process and processes of economic 
development may be understood better if economists focus on the role 
played by barriers to substitution caused by the use of trade-off-
preventing decision rules and the production processes that require 
specific human and physical resources. Job selection criteria embody 
this via ‘essential’ requirements, but non-negotiable requirements of 
workers may result in poor structural adjustment. Production systems 
involve prerequisites and co-requisites but though firms can trade in 
factor markets this does not guarantee them instant means to 
achieving particular performance standards that potential customers 
demand. 
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1 Introduction 
This paper explores the implications of combining two notions that 
have long histories in the economics literature but which have always 
proved problematic for mainstream thinking. One is the idea that the 
population of decision makers often includes significant numbers of 
agents who employ decision rules that violate the Principle of Gross 
Substitution/the Axiom of Archimedes. Their decisions may be made in 
terms of a hierarchy of objectives (see Drakopoulos and Karayiannis, 
2004, for a survey of the historical development of this idea) or in 
terms of a checklist that specifies a set of targets, all of which must be 
met if a prospective course of action is to be deemed satisfactory (see 
Earl, 1986). The paper’s other key ingredient is the notion that what 
firms can produce is constrained not by a ‘given’ set of technological 
possibilities in conjunction with a set of prices for factors of production, 
but by the pool of resources and associated capabilities that the firm 
has at its disposal. This is particularly associated with the work of 
Penrose (1959) and Richardson (1972) and has been influential in the 
strategic management literature in what is known as the ‘resource-
based view of the firm’ (see Foss, ed., 1997 for a collection of key 
readings). However, as with so many modern economic notions, it can 
be found in Alfred Marshall’s (1920, p. 355) evolutionary analysis of 
firms, which emphasized that firms differ in how they do business 
because they have learnt different things after experimenting in 
different ways. Emphasis on differences between firms associated with 
learning is also evident in the ‘growth of knowledge’ approach to 
economics that Loasby (1999) has been developing with inspiration 
not merely from these writers but also from Hayek and Shackle. 
These two themes are brought together in several ways. Section 
2 is an attempt to make clear the ontological foundations of the paper, 
so that orthodox economists will have a better chance of seeing where 
the arguments are coming from and what makes them different from 
orthodox thinking. Section 3 examines the substitutability of human 
resources between different tasks and the role of non-compensatory 
decision rules on both the demand side and supply side of the labour 
market. Sections 4 and 5 examine the role of specific tools and flows 
of other inputs in production systems, likening them to prerequisites 
and co-requisites in university degree programmes.1 Section 6 can be 
                                                 
1  Following a suggestion by myself, Drakopoulos and Karayiannis (2004, p. 364) 
inserted a footnote motioning that scope for taking a ‘hierarchy of capabilities’ 
approach to production along such lines. However, they then added the suggestion 
that Encarnacion (1964) constitutes an early attempt to do so. This appears to 
misread Encarnacion’s paper, which brings the hierarchy idea into the firm only in 
terms of a hierarchy of managerial objectives. 
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seen as a contribution to the theory of monopolistic competition in 
which the product and other non-price attributes of the marketing mix 
become variables. It looks at the strategic implications of a 
conjunction of non-compensatory purchasing rules and supply-side 
capability constraints, while section 7 examines potential for firms to 
overcome capability shortfalls. Section 8 offers some concluding 
reflections. 
 
2 A complex systems perspective 
Orthodox economists are likely to have trouble appreciating the 
resource-based view of the firm as a significant advance in our 
understanding of how the economic system works. To argue that what 
a firm can do is presently constrained by its current labour force, its 
existing capital equipment and its relationships with supply chain 
members, customers and financiers naturally tends to sound like 
nothing more than a short-run analysis in fancy dress. Barney (2001) 
acknowledges this in his retrospective musings about the resource-
based view, a decade after his classic (1991) paper on its significance 
for strategic management. Though presently there may be some 
limitations on what the firm can do, managers wishing to emulate 
what other firms are doing can change the sets of resources at their 
disposal. Machines can be sold and alternatives purchased. Existing 
employees can be replaced by ones with different skills, or retrained, 
whichever is the least-cost option. Evidence that this happens is 
abundant: for example, General Electric has become a leading player 
in financial services and disposed of its small appliances interests, 
whilst Kodak is changing its focus from film-based photography to 
digital photography products. If resources are slow to be reallocated in 
response to changes in the production possibility set and consumer 
preferences, this is a reflection of transaction costs and/or sluggish 
adjustments in managerial vision. The former can be addressed by 
microeconomic reforms aimed at ‘freeing up markets’ while the latter 
will tend to be eliminated as more dynamic firms capture bigger 
markets shares. 
As Potts (2000) emphasises, orthodox economics is based on a 
formal view of the economy as a ‘field’ in which everything is 
connected to everything else to some degree. Any combinations and 
re-combinations of firms, workers, customers and products are 
possible, with relative prices determining which ones get selected. How 
the economy develops is thus driven by processes of substitution that 
are channelled by changes in relative prices consequent on changing 
mixes of supply and demand. By contrast, in arguing that the 
resource-based approach to the firm is not orthodox short-run thinking 
in fancy dress, I am seeing the economy in terms of what Potts calls a 
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‘complex systems’ perspective. That is to say, only some elements of 
the system are capable of connecting and the present set of 
connections, which is a consequence of past choices, constrains the 
sets of connections in terms of which we might subsequently map the 
economy. The economic system, from the heterodox standpoint, thus 
has a definite architecture and how it evolves is significantly shaped by 
breaks in chains of substitution.2    
From the complex systems standpoint, a resources/capabilities 
view of firms naturally goes with the hierarchical/checklist view of 
choice. However, they have hitherto tended to be written about 
separately. Taken together, as is done here, the two approaches seem 
to offer a way of making sense of supply and demand elasticities. It 
should be understood that it is not my intention to claim that 
substitution in consumption and production never takes place in 
response to changes in relative prices. Rather, the aim is to produce a 
change of mindset, away from the orthodox tendency always to go 
looking for substitution potential and towards a more pluralistic way of 
thinking that looks also for ways in which barriers to substitution 
channel the workings of the competitive process. 
 
3 The right person for the job 
Orthodox production theory is underpinned by the same ‘everyone has 
their price’ axiom that underpins orthodox consumer theory. On this 
way of looking at the world, anyone can be a brain surgeon or rocket 
scientist, or whatever, but some people are faster and more reliable at 
particular tasks and hence will command higher earnings for 
performing them. On the supply side of the labour market the 
message is that jobs that are unpleasant to perform, are located 
inconveniently and/or involve foregoing earnings in order to receive 
training can nonetheless attract applicants if the wages that are 
offered exceed those of jobs that do not have these disadvantages by 
a margin sufficient to compensate for having them. It is assumed 
there will always be a wage, albeit possibly a very high one, that will 
                                                 
2  The argument here can be thought of as an extension of the kind of thinking that 
underlies the different between conventional monetary economics and Post Keynesian 
monetary economics. In the former view, a reduction in short-term interest rates will 
cause a wide-ranging set of ripple effects: people who would have bought Treasury 
Bills will substitute into long-term bonds, depressing their yields, too, which will induce 
substitution in favour of equities, and rising equity prices will stimulate investment. 
Lower interest rates will also lead banks to want to lend and consumer to want to 
spend more. From the Post Keynesian standpoint, by contrast, the effectiveness of 
monetary policy may be undermined by the failure of these substitutions to occur if 
confidence is low: banks may have trouble finding would-be borrowers who match 
their lending criteria, and those with financial assets may prefer to shoulder a loss of 
interest income rather than switch to assets that carry a much bigger risk of capital 
loss (cf. Karacaoglu, 1984). 
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induce such substitution. Similarly, employers would offer more jobs to 
people with poor skills if the latter were willing to work for a low 
enough wage to compensate for their lower marginal revenue 
products. On this view, a firm whose members of staff are not 
particularly competent still has a chance of matching what its rivals do, 
so long as it can pay them low enough wages to offset their slowness 
and high defect rates. Individuals with particular preferences about the 
kind of work they are willing to do, and comparative advantages in 
doing certain kinds of work, will tend to end up with earnings that 
reflect relative scarcities of opportunities and capabilities and the 
preferences of themselves and employers in terms of net advantages. 
Clearly, the conventional wisdom provides a useful starting point 
for analysing some parts of the labour market. People who are better 
than others at performing a particular task tend to earn more, 
capturing at least some of the Ricardian rents that they generate, 
because firms compete with each other to hire them. For example, an 
unknown junior lawyer will command a much smaller fee than a very 
experienced one with a good reputation because of the lower 
probability that the junior would win a given case. It is also evident 
that some people will undertake very dangerous tasks if they judge 
the odds of getting themselves killed or maimed are small enough 
relative to the payoffs involved—for example, consider the supply of 
North Sea divers to oil rigs, 58 of whom lost their lives between 1971 
and 1999 (see Limbrick, 2002).3 
Despite this, a moment’s reflection on how modern labour 
markets work also provides evidence that is sharply at odds with a 
trade-off-based perspective. Consider the situation faced by someone 
who has their sights set on becoming a full professor of economics. 
The path to this goal comprises a set of hurdles.  
First, they must achieve good enough grades at high school or 
college to achieve admission to an economics degree programme. To 
graduate with an economics degree, they will have to take a number 
of ‘core’ units that serve as prerequisites for other units. If, say, they 
fail introductory econometrics, it may be catastrophic for their chances 
of graduating in economics, no matter how good they are at 
microeconomics and macroeconomic theory. They will also need a 
good enough grade point average to qualify for postgraduate study.  
If they fail to complete and be awarded their PhD, they will have 
no hope of achieving employment in a reputable research university. 
                                                 
3  It is interesting to note, however, that those facing possible death sentences for drug 
smuggling in Asia quite often claim that they only got involved under threats that 
they, or members of their families, would be killed if they refused to participate; it was 
not that they got involved because of large payments being promised to offset the 
risks of being caught and sentenced to death. 
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To advance to a tenured position, they must demonstrate adequate 
skills in teaching and achieving publications. When they seek full 
professorships, they will find that hiring or promotion criteria almost 
invariably include lists of both desirable and essential characteristics. 
For example, one might be expected to have an international 
reputation as a scholar, signified by success in achieving publications 
in top-league economics journals, a track record in raising research 
funds, experience of supervising PhD students, and so on. If criteria 
are listed as ‘essential’, the message is ‘don’t even think of applying if 
you do not have them to a sufficient degree’. Whereas with the 
‘desirable’ features there is room for one’s deficiencies in some 
respects to be offset by one’s stellar achievements in other areas on 
the list, the ‘essential’ criteria imply an intention on the part of the 
selection committee to use a non-compensatory decision rule. 
It was not always like this. When production theory was 
conceived, academics did not have to have PhDs to establish their 
careers, students were able to make a ‘knight’s move’ from one kind of 
degree to another, totally unrelated programme, and it was much 
easier for academics to switch between discipline areas.  
In the modern world, specialization appears to get in the way of 
substitution in production processes to a far greater degree than is 
recognized in the notion of diminishing marginal rates of 
transformation. Specific tasks require specific capabilities, so 
organizations set out to hire the right person for the job. On the other 
side of the labour market, workers set out to acquire particular sets of 
capabilities mindful of likely job opportunities and in the knowledge 
that, as the saying goes, ‘a square peg does not fit a round hole’. This 
can backfire and add to problems of structural unemployment if too 
many people invest in highly specific skills. For example, TV dramas 
have led many students to wish to study forensic science. A 
corresponding expansion in the number of university courses in this 
area has resulted in many more potential graduates than there are 
jobs available (see SEMTA, 2004, especially pp. 11-12).   
From this standpoint, the labour market works not so much as 
an equilibrating mechanism but as a sorting device in which positions 
get filled insofar as demand-side templates are matched by the 
profiles of those who offer their services. In the short run, mismatches 
between employers’ templates and workers’ capability profiles result in 
output being constrained by staff shortages, or some workers finding 
themselves structurally unemployed. In the long run, the traditional 
story partly comes back into its own: changes in relative wages may 
lead to flows of labour between areas and types of work, while 
changes in relative costs of particular skills may permit changes in 
relative prices of products and hence the diversion of demand along 
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channels that will eliminate product shortages and labour surpluses. 
However, there are two problems.  
The first difficulty is that such demand diversion may be limited 
by the use of priority-/checklist-based decision rules that serves as 
barriers to substitution in product markets. Secondly, some of the 
substitution that takes place between grades of skills may not be in 
terms of a given production function; rather, some production systems 
will be redesigned to permit the use of cheaper but less qualified 
workers. As Loasby (1982, pp. 237-8) observes: 
 
[A]s soon as we admit that technology is not given but has to be 
laboriously and expensively acquired, it is reasonable to ask why 
anyone should ever bother to develop techniques which would 
become worthwhile only if relative factor prices were to become 
very different from what they are. It would be rational, 
therefore, to discover—or rather to invent—only a small section 
of the isoquant… 
 
The deskilling process at the heart of what Ritzer (2000) calls 
‘McDonaldization’ is thus essentially not a matter of substitution within 
a given production function, any more than were the processes 
whereby Henry Ford cut the cost of building cars by finer and finer 
division of labour and the development of more and more specialized 
machinery. Deskilling requires the development of new systems of 
production to tap into cheaper but less capable sources of labour. 
Many jobs are impossible to do if one lacks basic skills in reading 
and mathematics; others require particular physical attributes. 
However, how competent one might be at performing a task in a world 
of specialized knowledge will depend not upon the level of education 
and training one has achieved but also upon the area in which one has 
specialized. At a basic level, different activities may require a similar 
kind of knowledge, and those who possess that knowledge can switch 
between them, but at more sophisticated levels of knowledge, 
potential for substitution becomes increasingly limited. In a medical 
emergency, we would be far happier to be attended to by final year 
veterinary science undergraduate if no doctor were available, than by 
someone with a PhD in economics, but in normal times we would settle 
for nothing less than a properly accredited medical physician. If we 
have, say, a puzzling problem with our digestive system, then we will 
insist on seeing a gastrologist, rather than a mere general medical 
practitioner; if we have trouble with our eyes, we need to see an 
ophthalmologist, and so on. 
At each stage in the process of becoming competent to perform 
a particular set of tasks with a particular degree of reliability a person 
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will have had to master other pre-requisite tasks to particular 
standards. In terms of our medical skills example, the idea of a 
hierarchy of capabilities would mean that, at their level of 
specialisation, a gastrologist and an ophthalmologist could not do each 
other’s jobs, but they could function as general practitioners unless 
they had forgotten too much of their original training in medicine. If 
they had indeed forgotten much of their broader medical knowledge 
and their specialist positions could no longer be funded, they would 
only be as valuable as medical students, or in an entirely different 
profession that required some of the non-medical skills that they had 
picked up.  
It is worth pausing at this juncture to reflect on how an 
increasingly specialized training can eventually result in people 
developing skills that enable them to switch into a different kind of 
activity. As professionals such as medical specialists, academics, 
engineers and lawyers get to know more and more about their areas 
of expertise, they will face choices between specializing further within 
their fields or coordinating those who have specialized further and 
know more about certain aspects than they do. Skills that they acquire 
in budgeting resources and in people management will be much more 
generic than the skills they had earlier acquired. These new skills may 
make it possible for them to move to a higher organizational level as 
senior managers. As they attempt to move up their career ladders, 
they may find themselves competing once again with colleagues with 
whom they had earlier ceased to compete directly due to their 
differences in expertise. For example, a professor of economics and a 
professor of biology could not do each other’s jobs, but either might 
one day become a vice-chancellor after gaining experience in head of 
division and dean of faculty roles. However, without having track 
records in the latter roles, they could not hope to become a vice-
chancellor. They might also find themselves competing with those who 
had acquired the required managerial capabilities outside of academia.  
This ‘hierarchy of capabilities’ view thus offers a way of making 
some sense of the segmented structure of the labour market, including 
how it is divided up between internal labour markets and markets for 
positions that have open ‘ports of entry’, as in the work of Doeringer 
and Piore (1971/1985). By following a rather similar line of thinking, 
Martens (2004) is able to make sense of why specialists cluster 
together and why payoffs to high-level education in developing 
countries are often very poor. Highly-trained people often will be 
unable to make use of their skills to the full unless they can do so in 
conjunction with colleagues who have been trained to a similar level: 
someone with leading-edge skills in information technology will be 
much more valuable in Silicon Valley amidst like minds than trying to 
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work in a developing country with colleagues whose level of training is 
far lower. 
The unavailability of staff at the level required may have a 
discontinuous impact on operations, even to the extent of 
necessitating closing down until replacements have been attracted or 
others trained up to the standard required. For example, early in 2006, 
Brumby’s, an Australian bakery franchise operator, was driven to hire 
20 qualified bakers from Vietnam on 4-year working visas due to a 
shortage of local skills that had in 2005 forced it to scale back its 
expansion programme and even close a couple of its northern 
Queensland operations because its local franchisees could not find staff 
(see Millar, 2006). Without bakers, bread could not be baked and, for 
a national chain, whose uniformity of quality and service is vital for the 
value of its brand (for example, so that shoppers can buy bread from 
unfamiliar outlets ‘on the run’), the solution was not temporarily to 
bring in staff who were not properly trained. Brumby’s search pool for 
workers from developing countries who might be willing to move 
overseas temporarily to achieve developed-country baker’s wages was 
also highly specific: as a former French colony, Vietnam has European 
baking traditions that its near neighbours lack. 
Institutional arrangement and lifestyle issues may extend the 
length of the ‘short run’ considerably. Trades unions and professional 
associations may be able to limit entry by workers from other areas, 
as with doctors from Russia facing accreditation problems if they move 
overseas, despite having years of experience, because of closed-shop 
practices by local colleges of surgeons. These bodies may also insist on 
over-long apprenticeship arrangements that both delay supply 
responses and also deter people from signing up due to the poor pay 
they will receive during the apprentice phase. (In the Brumby’s case in 
Australia, it appears that the firm can train its franchisees to run its 
bakery systems to the firm’s required standard in just 12 weeks, 
whereas the staff the franchisees will need to hire to work alongside 
them and relieve them have been required to undergo four-year 
apprenticeships.)  
It may also prove impossible to find staff prepared to move to 
the location where their particular skills are needed. Non-trade-off 
based decision making may apply on the supply side of the labour 
market, too, with workers being reluctant to change location because 
of local ‘ties that bind’, such as their wish not to disrupt their children’s 
schooling, move away from their aged parents or social involvements. 
In some case, the prospective local climate may simply be seen as ‘too 
hot’ or ‘too cold’. In cases where jobs are very dangerous, there may 
simply not be enough people who are both in the geographical area 
and willing to take the risk, regardless of the remuneration that is 
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offered (cf. the ‘safety first’ view of choice under uncertainty in Roy, 
1952 and Blatt, 1983). In such cases, the only way to increase output 
may be to redesign the process and bring the hazards within 
boundaries acceptable to enough potential employees.  
A ‘safety first’ barrier to labour immobility may arise not merely 
where risks are of a physical kind. A new job in a distant location can 
also look very dangerous in terms of one’s emotional security and 
social standing. For example, workers with the right skills may hold 
back from applying for such posts because they are nervous that they 
might not ‘fit in’ and could then suffer adverse social comment if they 
gave up and returned home, ‘their tails between their legs’. Such an 
outcome might, in prospect, seem too humiliating. (They might also 
find themselves unable to go back to their previous kinds of work 
there.) If it is not the remuneration that is the problem in attracting 
workers, employers in such situations need to remove the causes of 
anxiety in order to attract applicants, not increase the pay they offer 
(for example, allowing generous leave to fly home regularly, or flying 
them in to see where they will be living rather than expecting a 
conference-call interview and large wage offer to be enough). 
Quite aside from these considerations, it should be noted that 
mismatches between supply and demand may persist for far longer 
than mainstream theorists might expect in part because the very idea 
of gearing up to work in a particular trade may be unthinkable to those 
who might be able to improve their positions financially by doing so. It 
is not the case that everyone has their price when it comes to moving 
between jobs. Moreover, even if some people will, as it is commonly 
put, ‘sell out’ if the price is right, a firm may experience long delays in 
finding out what that price is. Labour markets do not work as in a 
Walrasian auction and a firm will raise its offers only gradually in order 
to avoid needlessly letting its workers capture the rents that they will 
generate.  
One further consideration when labour supply is highly inelastic 
is the intra-marginal cost of paying those workers who are, reluctantly, 
prepared to move. Paying them way over what incumbents are earning 
may be difficult to sustain once word seeps out to the latter, yet 
paying the higher wage to all may cost the firm vastly more than the 
marginal revenue it can get from making up its shortfall of skilled 
workers. 
To sum up this section, we may say that the idea that certain 
kinds of production require particular sets of capabilities for which 
other sets will not serve as substitutes provides a way of illuminating 
the nature of structural unemployment and labour market bottlenecks. 
If such problems are to be dealt with rapidly, it may be insufficient to 
rely upon changes in relative wages. 
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4 The right tools for the job 
Employees who have reached a particular level of capability may be of 
little use without particular physical assets.4 Examples abound: a saw 
is for cutting, and a screwdriver is for joining components together; 
their roles cannot be reversed with any success no matter how well 
trained a carpenter might be. Indeed, the more highly skilled a worker 
is in a particular area, the more they will often be dependent on access 
to an array of specialized tools to make the most of their expertise, 
whereas less capable workers might be overwhelmed by such a choice 
of special tools or find certain tools too powerful to use safely or 
accurately because each error they make is swiftly magnified.  
Tools themselves may be highly complementary. For example, to 
run an Internet-based business, one must have staff with adequate 
computing skills and a good enough computer to run the necessary 
systems of software. Failures to upgrade system elements in parallel 
may result in the system ceasing to function as it once did. (For 
example, if an Internet service provider changes its provider of dial-up 
phone services, clients using, say Apple iMac computers that were 
running perfectly well on OS9.0 may find they have lost Internet 
access, but if they upgrade to OSX, they may then find that their 
version of Microsoft Office no longer runs, because System X’s ‘Classic’ 
requires the installation of OS9.1 in order to work. To switch to 
broadband may require a new computer with bigger RAM, and so on.)  
Of course, in some situations substitution is possible—for 
example, in the absence of a screwdriver and screws, two pieces of 
wood might be nailed or glued together. However, to produce a 
particular end result in terms of strength, reliability, quality of finish, 
etc., a particular type of tool and technology may be essential. 
As with human resources, physical capital has degrees of 
specialisation. Not merely are there saws for different kinds of cutting, 
and screwdrivers specific to particular types of screws that are 
differently suited to particular applications, but some tools are specific 
to particular end products. Probably the most famous case of the last 
category is the tooling developed by the Ford Motor Company during 
the process of making the Model-T cheaper and cheaper to produce. 
The specificity of this tooling was such that, when Ford switched to 
                                                 
4  Where a worker with particular capabilities must be teamed with particular capital 
items, there is no chance of measuring the marginal productivity of either in isolation, 
as Georgescu-Roegen (1935, p.  46) pointed out long ago. However, to be fair to 
orthodox thinking, this problem is probably less extreme than it first appears, since it 
may be possible to measure the performance of a worker with different grades of the 
same kind of equipment (for example, a secretary with different vintages of 
computer), or the impact of different levels of training on what a worker can do with 
particular equipment. 
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producing the Model-A, the changeover took 18 months, during which 
Ford laid off 60,000 workers and had to replace 15,000 machine tools 
and rebuild a further 25,000. This also had a human resource legacy 
that went beyond the deskilling of the firm’s manual workers: Ford’s 
corporate culture remained obsessed with cost cutting for years 
afterwards, with marketing and public relations staff continuing to 
occupy a low status in the organization (see Selznick, 1957, pp. 109-
110). 
Investments in highly specific skills and tooling limit the power of 
competitive processes by limiting the flow of resources out of declining 
markets and deterring entry into markets where fat profits are being 
earned. Increased viscosity in resource flows is not due merely to the 
kinds of logistical nightmare that Ford faced on the demise of the 
Model-T or delays that one might expect to suffer if ordering bespoke 
machinery rather than buying it, so to speak, ‘off the peg’. Rather, the 
problem in both cases is the poor second-hand market for assets 
tailored for making just one type of output.  
It is asset specificity that provides the underlying reason why 
economists should share Richardson’s (1960) concern with potential 
for failures of investment coordination (not merely in terms of physical 
investments but also, as the earlier example of forensic science 
training indicates, investment in human capital). In a market where 
production is based on highly specific assets, incumbent firms may 
have trouble switching to other activities if there is excessive entry or 
demand turns down, since they will be unable to raise much by selling 
their equipment. The least bad option may be to carry on producing so 
long as the price at least covers their incremental, non-sunk costs, 
until the assets wear out (see Salter, 1960; Harrigan, 1980). In 
markets where incumbents are making high profits, potential entrants 
may judge that it is impossible to compete by using general-purpose 
equipment against the incumbents’ tailored systems. However, even if 
they can come up with the funds to make such investments, a 
deterrent to going ahead would be the risk that, if a market entry 
attempt failed, product-specific assets would be worth only their value 
as scrap. This is in sharp contrast to a situation in which, say, 
managers change their requirements for lathes, versus welding 
equipment: in the latter case, they should be able to find well-
functioning markets for second-hand lathes and welding equipment in 
which they can sell the former and purchase the latter, with second-
hand prices differing from new prices in ways that are closely related 
to the extent of physical depreciation.  
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5 Production prerequisites and co-requisites 
As well as its workers and items of capital equipment (both hardware 
and software), a crucial resource for a firm is the set of relationships 
that determine the quality of its supply chain; this is what John Kay 
(1993) calls the firm’s ‘architecture’. Just how significant this is 
becomes apparent if we recognize that the architecture of a production 
system often looks like the architecture of a university degree 
programme in the sense that to produce a particular end result specific 
ingredients are required and some of these take the form of 
prerequisites or co-requisites. 
Workers with specific skills and specific tools will often be using 
inputs of particular materials. To run a bakery, one needs not merely 
bakers and ovens but also flour, yeast and supplies of energy. If the 
wrong kind of flour is delivered, it may still be possible to bake 
something, but not the mix of items that the bakery manager had 
intended. With some kinds of input flows, there may be scope for 
substitution as a means to keep on producing the same finished 
product, just as one can power a (suitably adapted) car with LPG, CNG 
and ethanol blends as well as via standard petrol, albeit with trade-offs 
in terms of some performance parameters. However, in some 
production systems particular raw materials and other inputs may be 
required for output to be possible at all (just as it is disastrous to try 
to fill a diesel vehicle with petrol, or a petrol vehicle with diesel fuel), 
or to meet a particular performance standard (just as an engine may 
run on lower octane fuels but to achieve higher standards of 
performance will require higher-octane fuel). For example, a firm that 
is making plaster-based building products will need a supply of 
gypsum, just as a pottery will need clay. Without water and electricity, 
neither business may be able to operate at all.  
With modern, high technology products that are assembled from 
dozens or thousands of components, it is sometimes possible viably to 
retrofit non-core elements if there are problems in obtaining supplies, 
but in some cases it will be more costly to design products to ensure 
that this is possible. Competitive pressures may prevent firms from 
investing in such options and force them instead to concentrate on 
ensuring reliability in supply.5  
Where production systems take this kind of form, the division of 
labour between firms in the value chain will be shaped by assessments 
                                                 
5  In this connection, it is interesting to note that the collapse of MG-Rover in 2005 was 
triggered by the non-delivery of bumper mouldings for the firm’s most successful 
model, the Rover 75. The supplier was frustrated by delays in payment, but since it 
was impossible, given the way the production system was set up, for these parts to be 
retro-fitted, the 75’s production ceased and with it the cashflow from which the firm 
was already struggling to meet its bills. 
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of strategic risk of what Williamson (1985) calls ‘hold-up’. Williamson 
focuses on hold-ups that are opportunistic, in the sense that the party 
withholding supply is acting with guile in the pursuit of an advantage 
at the expense of the other party. A typical example of what he has in 
mind is where a trade union or contractor threatens to withhold supply 
in order to get better terms, having seen the other party is faring 
better than they expected them to be at the time the contract was 
negotiated. 
Williamson insists that for hold-up fears to provide a basis for 
vertical integration, asset specificity must be a feature of the 
production process. If a firm uses general-purpose equipment, being 
let down by an upstream supplier of inputs or a downstream customer 
or distributor is not a disaster, for the firm can use its resources to 
make other things; by contrast, if specific assets are lying idle they are 
doing nothing to cover their capital costs and, as noted earlier, if they 
have to be sold, their second-hand values may be tiny compared with 
their original costs.  
Though plausible at first sight, Williamson’s analysis has some 
holes that the prerequisites perspective can help to plug. The crucial 
area that needs attention in Williamson’s analysis is that of the 
circumstances under which another supply chain member would be 
tempted to act opportunistically against the rest of the supply chain. 
As Foss (1993) points out, if you are sharing a boat, sinking it to harm 
the other occupants also harms you. Thus we should not expect a firm 
with product-specific assets to be opportunistically held up by another 
firm in the supply chain if the latter firm has also made investments of 
a product-specific nature. Rather, as was noticed by Neil Kay (1997, 
chapter 3), the sorts of supply chain participants to worry about are 
those that produce outputs that are not specific to that particular 
supply chain but which would be valuable to businesses in other supply 
chains. Such suppliers have leverage if the hold-up victim cannot 
arrange alternative supplies of the input at short notice without 
incurring considerable costs and if the input in question is in short 
enough supply for the threat to find other, more remunerative 
customers to prove credible. Ultimately, the story is still being driven 
by barriers to substitution, but these are additional to those on which 
Williamson focuses and they are best seen as providing the 
foundations of (or an alternative to) another of his conditions for 
internalisation, namely, small numbers of potential trading partners.  
For example, an ‘oil company’ that invests in oil refineries has 
specific assets a prerequisite for whose operation is crude oil, but 
without refineries, crude oil is of no use except as a store of value. 
Because ultimately the known supply of unrefined oil will diminish, oil 
companies have to worry about not getting oil to keep their refineries 
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busy, so it makes good sense for them to try to achieve control of oil 
fields that would also be valuable to their rivals. If oil discoveries were 
vastly outstripping demand projections, or if oil refineries could work 
with other inputs of hydrocarbons, such as biomass, then oil 
companies would have no incentive in option value terms to acquire 
secure access to supplies of crude oil. 
Although the message so far in this section is that a non-
substitution view of production process is central to understanding the 
strategic risks that firms face and hence the kinds of market entry and 
internalisation decisions that they take, the prerequisites view of 
production needs to be seen in a broader context, namely its 
significance at the level of the State. From this standpoint, for 
example, we could understand the US invasion of Iraq as a covert 
means of ensuring that the oil-dependent US economy would have 
continued access to adequate supplies of oil rather than having to 
develop capabilities for coping in a less energy-intensive manner and 
having many of its past investments pushed down in value. Similarly, 
we can perhaps better appreciate why the British Labour Party was for 
so long intent, via the infamous ‘Clause 4’ of its constitution, on 
nationalized ownership of the ‘commanding heights’ of the economy, 
such as coal, steel, electricity and other public utilities: for 
‘commanding heights’, we would now read ‘common production 
prerequisites’. 
The argument here can also be seen as an extension, to the 
level of the firm of themes from development economics. They are 
perhaps most redolent of Rostow’s (1960) ‘pre-conditions for take off 
into sustained economic growth’ and the emphasis accorded to the 
development of ‘forward and backward linkages’ and elimination of 
structural bottleneck’s in Hirschman’s (1958) work on development 
strategies.6 Without, say, particular standards of literacy, public 
health, infrastructure and property rights, an entire economy might fail 
to generate enough investment to achieve ongoing growth. Likewise, a 
development plan may founder if complementary elements are not all 
delivered: for example, building a dam for a hydro electric scheme 
may permit irrigated farming and provide power for an electric arc 
furnace that will reprocess scrap steel from a ship-breaking operation 
(cf. the Volta Dam project in Ghana), but if any one of the elements is 
missing none of the rest may be viable.  
Ideas from this section are also much in keeping with themes in 
Schumacher’s (1974) Small is Beautiful . Development aid can be 
wasted if not complementary with the skills of the local population: for 
                                                 
6  Hirschman’s book provided some of the inspira tion for Moss’s (1981) An Economic 
Theory of Business Strategy, as did the resource-based view of the firm, but Moss did 
not focus on the non-substitution issue. 
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example, tractors may contribute little to agriculture without spare 
parts back-up and skilled mechanics to keep them running, so an 
‘intermediate technology’ (such as an improved design of plough) that 
enables output to be increased whilst still using animal power may be 
much more effective. More bluntly, Schumacher (p. 48) points out that 
‘An expansion of man’s ability to bring forth secondary products is 
useless unless preceded by an expansion of his ability to win primary 
products from the earth’.  
It is perhaps Tom Friedman’s (1999) The Lexus and the Olive 
Tree that will be of particular interest here, for his argument is 
implicitly in line with institutionalist and evolutionary thinking that sees 
the economy as a system of rules. Friedman (1999, chapter 7) 
characterizes economies in computing terms: they can differ in terms 
of the kind of basic hardware they have (free market, communist, 
hybrid?), and their grade of operating system. Nations also differ in 
the quality of ‘software’ to which they have access, which he sees as 
their legal and regulatory systems that shape how business gets done. 
Friedman (1999, p. 129) argues that, 
 
Good software includes banking laws, commercial laws, 
bankruptcy rules, contract laws, business codes of 
conduct, a genuinely independent central bank, property 
rights that encourage risk-taking, processes for judicial 
review, international accounting standards, commercial 
courts, regulatory oversight agencies backed up by an 
impartial judiciary, laws against conflict of interest and 
insider trading by government officials, and officials and 
citizens ready to implement these rules in a reasonably 
consistent manner 
 
For Friedman, trying to run high performance software with inadequate 
hardware or a low-grade operating system is likely greatly to limit 
rates of growth: as with a computer, there will be errors, system 
crashes and generally very slow running. 
 
6 Capabilities and competitive strategy 
From the standpoint of orthodox theory, a lack of the capabilities 
required to deliver particular standards of performance on particular 
product characteristics is not to be seen as a major strategic issue for 
a firm. The firm in question may be pretty hopeless at doing some 
things with its existing pool of resources, but it will be relatively better 
than its competitors at doing other things. It should specialize in 
producing goods or services that make the most of its comparative 
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advantage. If the firm is at an absolute disadvantage, in the sense that 
it does not do anything better in non-price terms than its rivals and its 
labour costs prevent it from offering a generally inferior product at a 
price low enough to compensate for the product’s non-price inferiority, 
then it may still be able to supply against its more competent rivals if 
it relocates production to a lower-wage economy. Relocation offshore 
may not be necessary. If the firm is in an economy where there is a 
general shortage of the capabilities in respect of which it is deficient, 
and if its rivals are overseas firms, then sooner or later its costs should 
fall relative to its rivals due to a trade deficit putting downward 
pressure on the country’s exchange rate. Either way, if it cannot 
produce goods that match those of its rivals in quality, it may stay in 
business by undercutting them in terms of price. 
There are several problems with the standard story, which leave 
open the possibility that such a firm would be forced out of business 
unless it managed somehow to obtain capabilities to match those of its 
rivals. First, relocating production offshore may be impossible with 
many kinds of service products. Secondly, the capabilities that are 
available in lower-wage economies may be far less well developed 
than those that the firm presently has, for example in areas important 
to quality such as attention to detail. (European carmakers such as 
Ford and Volkswagen have tended to run into this issue when using 
South Africa as a low-cost centre for assembling right-hand-drive 
models for export to markets such as Australia and the UK.) The lower 
wages will need to be low enough to permit the even more inferior 
product to sell at an even lower price than the low price required for it 
to sell at the non-price standards achievable in its country of origin 
(not to mention increased transport costs). Thirdly, if a viable off-
shore location for manufacture cannot be found, there is no guarantee 
that the domestic exchange rate will fall rapidly enough to maintain 
the viability of local production, for capital inflows may offset a 
widening current account deficit. If so, the burden of adjustment will 
fall on money wages in the domestic economy. 
The fourth problem is arguably the most significant: a firm that 
tries to compensate for its lack of competence in some areas by 
making the most of what it is good at doing or by selling at a lower 
price may end up far less profitable than firms that are much more 
rounded performers. The latter may fare far better if the population of 
potential buyers is predominately choosing in a non-compensatory 
manner using checklists or hierarchical decision rules. If buyers are 
prepared to spend up to a particular sum to obtain a product of a 
particular standard and can find firms that offer products of that 
standard, then if they stick to their decision rules they will buy from 
such firms, not from firms that offer cheaper products that fail to 
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match up to their requirements. Thus, for example, a car that, in 
terms of widely-employed decision rules looks wonderful or handles 
brilliantly but has a reputation for unreliability, rusting, precipitous 
depreciation, inadequate luggage space and a poor safety rating will 
pick up very limited market share even if it is relatively cheap, as will a 
product that is generally adequate but whose dreadful appearance 
reflects its manufacturer’s shortage of capabilities in the area of 
styling. From the non-compensatory view of choice, a shortfall in a 
single area of capability could prove catastrophic to a firm if the 
shortfall is in an area that is a core requirement/high priority for the 
bulk of its potential customers. The firm’s first priority should be to use 
its resources to improve its capabilities in the core area and get its 
product up to the required standard. Next, it should attend to meeting 
the next-most important area in which it is presently failing to match 
the typical customer’s requirements (see further, Earl and Wakeley, 
2006). 
If these non-compensatory decision rules are common, being 
over-endowed with talents in some areas may prove detrimental to the 
firm’s profitability in another way: for example, over-engineered 
products that exceed the requirements of the bulk of one’s market in 
some areas may cost more to make than the offerings of rivals who 
have smaller teams of engineers and/or are not paying for the top 
engineering talent or facilities, but have merely spent enough to meet 
customer standards. The firm would have done better to spend less on 
capabilities in engineering and more on capabilities in other areas, 
beginning with capabilities in market research to discover the hopes 
and areas of intolerance of its potential customers. 
 
7 Correcting Capability Deficits 
In the long run, a firm that is presently unable to meet particular 
performance standards may be able to acquire the necessary 
capabilities, either by processes of internal learning or from outside, or 
some combination thereof. But what do we mean by the ‘long run’ if 
we are viewing production theory in terms of capabilities and 
emphasizing prerequisite or co-requisite relationships between them or 
between capabilities and output standards? Rather than seeing the 
long run as the situation in which a firm can vary all of its factors of 
production within a given production function, it seems appropriate to 
see the long run in terms of the time by which the firm will be able to 
achieve a particular capability if it sets out now to try to reach it. This 
way of looking at the long run can refer to performance standards with 
an existing genre of products (such as a fuel economy target for a 
particular size of car, or reaching the top five in customer satisfaction 
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ratings at JDPower.com) or commercial viability of a new genre of 
product (such as a fuel-cell powered car). 
The capabilities that are being pursued may be spelt out in terms 
of both non-price and price performances, such as the capability to 
produce a digital single lens reflex camera with seven-megapixel 
photographic capacity that could be retailed for less than $1000. 
Different capabilities will take different lengths of time to cultivate or 
acquire: achieving ‘zero defects’ in production of a given item may be 
possible much more rapidly than the achievement of certain 
performance standards that involve innovation. For some capabilities, 
the long run may take several decades to achieve, but for others 
merely months. For example, the first filmless camera was patented 
by Texas Instruments in 1972, and a few years later Kodak developed 
its first solid-state image sensors. It then took until 1986 for Kodak to 
develop the first one-megapixel sensor and it was 1991 before Kodak 
was able to release a commercial digital camera for photojournalists. 
Kodak’s first mass-market product was launched in March 1995, 
eleven months after Apple’s Quicktake 100 had been launched (see 
Bells, n.d.). Since then, however, digital camera performance 
standards have increased far more rapidly: what was once a 
revolutionary new technological paradigm now has a much clearer 
prospective evolutionary trajectory, enabling it to develop momentum 
(cf. Sahal, 1985). Different organizations will take different periods of 
time to reach the same level of competence in some areas, and for 
some of them, the goal will be impossible to attain—just as with music 
students who start to learn the piano at the same time but, because of 
differences in their motivation and raw talent, get to different end 
standards at different rates. 
In some cases, a firm will be able to improve its standards in 
some areas by diverting resources from improving performance in 
other areas and using non-specific skills and capital equipment to 
solve problems. However, in other cases, progress will require a 
specific capability that the firm does not yet possess. If so, the choice 
is between trying to develop the necessary capability by oneself or 
gaining (faster) access to it via takeover, joint ventures or 
outsourcing, drawing upon the capabilities of other organizations. 
The latter set of strategies may sound like a return to the 
standard viewpoint in which capabilities are merely something to be 
purchased in the market if one has the wherewithal, rather than the 
firm’s trajectory being constrained by its existing capabilities. 
However, these strategies for dealing with present capability shortfalls 
have their own problems that may prevent the firm from getting on to 
the trajectory to which it aspires.  
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The takeover route is inherently problematic: a firm seeking to 
acquire improved capabilities on a wide front may need to acquire a 
firm that is already doing better than itself in the same market. A 
minnow will normally only be able to eat up another minnow, or 
something even smaller. We can get a sense of what can happen from 
the case of emerging Malaysian carmaker Proton, which tried to 
develop its own designs to reduce its dependence on slightly adapted 
older-generation cars built under license from Mitsubishi. It purchased 
Lotus, a British sports car maker and automotive engineering 
consultancy firm, to assist in this process. The first fruits of this 
strategy were vehicles that handled well but had major interior quality 
problems that necessitated redevelopment work and a virtual re-
launch. This is pretty much what one might have expected given the 
background of Lotus: it would have had much to contribute on 
suspensions but virtually no experience in mass production.  
Successful capability outsourcing requires particular capabilities 
itself, for example, how to choose between suppliers of consulting 
services or temporary staff and coordinate the interaction between 
their personnel and regular employees (or between different 
contractors if one is outsourcing a variety of different activities to 
different firms), or which supplier of components or services to use, 
and how to negotiate deals and ensure timely supply. There is also the 
‘it takes one to know one’ issue: to recognize that one lacks knowledge 
of a particular kind or up-to-date equipment may be rather easier than 
to judge whether one is being provided with inputs of the standard one 
seeks, or of the standard one needs to have to match one’s opposition. 
To obtain advice, a third party may need to be enlisted, possibly 
someone defecting from the rival one is seeking to match.  
Outsourcing the activities the firm is not good enough at doing 
itself may seem perfectly natural in terms of notions of specialization 
and comparative advantage, but it can be problematic if it calls into 
question the integrity of the brand. For example, prior to coming under 
German ownership, Rolls-Royce was increasingly using other 
carmakers’ parts, such as automatic gearboxes from General Motors 
and suspension systems from Citroen, which were rather at odds with 
its attempts to maintain its position as the producer of cars that would 
be seen as the best in the world. It is easier for an upwardly mobile 
firm to enhance its products via outsourcing some of their elements 
from suppliers with better reputations, than for a firm with an 
established reputation that is falling on hard times: the former can 
usefully publicize their bought-in aspects, whereas the latter may need 
to keep knowledge about them from seeping out. 
If a firm seeks to increase its pool of internal of capabilities it 
faces a number of problems. One issue, emphasized by Penrose 
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(1959), is the problem of integrating new staff into the firm’s existing 
way of doing things and personnel structure so that their skills can be 
used to best effect . New staff are not like a new printer that can 
simply be plugged into a computer and is then ready to go (and even 
that is not always the case!); rather, it takes time and 
experimentation to discover where best to deploy them and for them 
to get to know the idiosyncrasies of the organization, namely who is 
who, what is what and how things are done.  
It should also be noted that there is the question of what is the 
most cost-effective cognitive way of developing capabilities (i.e. in 
respect of individual learning as distinct from the question of whether 
to try to ensure existing staff develop more skills rather than 
expanding the skills base by hiring more staff). Essentially there are 
three possibilities: (i) teach oneself beginning with a blank sheet of 
paper and no preconceptions, so to speak; (ii) learn by inference from 
reverse engineering rival firms’ products; and (iii) learn with the 
assistance of a more experienced business via a technology transfer or 
joint venture arrangement. The first two strategies seem more likely 
than the third to promote deep learning because they force staff to 
engage in more creative problem solving than they would if they were 
being guided closely by others. The difference is rather like that 
between learning economics by studying the history of economic 
thought and original articles, versus being spoon-fed the subject from 
a textbook. Routes (i) and (ii) may be more costly in the short run, 
and may well increase the time it takes for the firm to reach particular 
standards of competence, but the self-sufficiency they promote may 
stand the firm in good stead should its suppliers of technology decide 
to cease providing assistance. Moreover, a technology licensing 
agreement, even one that includes tuition from staff of the source 
company, does not guarantee that capabilities to perform at the same 
standard as the source company will be achieved: because of the tacit 
knowledge problem identified by Polanyi (1962, 1967), attainments 
will depend on the particular insights that the recipient firm’s staff are 
capable of achieving, just as students who take the same course and 
study equally hard from the same books and lectures will not achieve 
equal scores. 
 
8 Conclusion 
Orthodox economic theory has an optimistic view of the potential for 
substitution as a means of ameliorating limited access to particular 
kinds of resources. It presents economising as the activity of exploring 
whether small switches of resources in one direction or another can be 
used as a means of improving profits or consumer welfare. In this 
paper, by contrast, the focus has been on barriers to substitution in 
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economic systems. If consumers are unwilling to compromise on 
particular requirements (and why should they be, if they can find 
suppliers who offer exactly what they are looking for?), firms need to 
have the skills, equipment and supply chain partners with the 
combined capacity to offer products with profiles that match customer 
templates. To meet customer requirements at minimum cost, firms 
may have to use workers with particular sets of skills and equipment 
that has been designed specifically for that purpose. To attract the 
specific types of workers, firms may in turn have to offer employment 
packages that offer particular bundles of features. When trying to 
attract buyers for products or one’s labour services, or when trying to 
attract employees, it may be unwise to see a lack of interest as due to 
too high a price being demanded or too low remuneration being 
offered; from the heterodox standpoint, non-price aspects may 
frequently dominate in a non-compensatory way. If they do, that is 
where attention needs to be devoted to improve performance. 
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